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B E L I E F R E V I S I O N T H E O RY Hanti Lin
We often revise beliefs in response to new information. But which ways of
revising beliefs are “OK” and which are not? A belief revision theory is
meant to provide a general answer, with a sense of “OK” that it specifies.
This article is an introduction to belief revision theory and its foundations,
with a focus on some issues that have not received sufficient attention.
First we will see what belief revision theories are, and examine their
possible normative or evaluative interpretations. Second we will compare
the standard belief theory called AGM with its alternatives, especially the
alternatives that are motivated by nonmonotonic logic and formal learning
theory. Third we will discuss counterexamples to some belief revision
theories, and categorize how we might explain those counterexamples
away. Fourth and finally we will examine a variety of motivated formal
techniques for constructing belief revision theories, and discuss how those
motivations might be transformed into explicit arguments.
1 introduction
We often revise beliefs in response to new information. But which ways of
revising beliefs are “OK” and which are not? A belief revision theory is
meant to provide a general answer, with a sense of “OK” that it specifies.
This article is an introduction to some belief revision theories and their
foundations. We will see what belief revision theories are, or could possibly
be, as normative or evaluative theories, and discuss why most belief revision
theories in the literature tend to claim to be only about idealized, perfect
rationality (Section 2). We will survey a variety of motivated, formal
techniques for constructing belief revision theories, and see how to use
these techniques to construct the standard theory called AGM and its
dissenters (Section 3–Section 4). We will discuss how we might argue
against a belief revision theory (Section 5), and how we might argue for it
(Section 6).
Articles surveying belief revision theories have been available, such
as the excellent ones by Hansson (2017), Rodrigues, Gabbay, and Russo
(2011), and Huber (2013a, 2013b). To help the reader make the most of the
survey articles available, including the present one, let me explain what
my emphases will be.
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◦ Earlier surveys tend to focus on a particular normative or evalua-
tive interpretation of formal theories of belief revision, taking those
theories to say something about idealized, perfect rationality. This
is the dominant interpretation in the literature. Other possible inter-
pretations will be explored here as well. In fact, the choice among
possible interpretations ultimately concerns the choice among very
different research programs in belief revision theory—or so I will
argue in Section 2.3.
◦ Earlier surveys tend to focus on the standard, AGM theory of belief
revision, together with its add-ons and improvements. But I wish to
spend more time on dissenters from the AGM theory. In Section 4.4, I
will present belief revision theories that disagree with the content of
the AGM theory in permitting something that the AGM theory prohibits.
(These theories usually come from so-called nonmonotonic logic.) In
Section 4.6, I will present belief revision theories that disagree with
the spirit of the AGM theory in taking the ultimate concern to be finding
the truth rather than conforming to what intuition says about ratio-
nality. (These theories usually come from so-called formal learning
theory.)
◦ The use of intuitive counterexamples is important when we argue
against a belief revision theory, and earlier surveys do cover that. But
I will make a first step toward categorizing how counterexamples
might be explained away. The reason is that the dialectic exchange
between alleging-counterexamples and explaining-them-away turns
out to raise very interesting issues about the goal and nature of belief
revision theory. This will be the highlight of Section 5.
◦ Earlier surveys tend to focus on various motivated techniques for
constructing theories of belief revision. But I will explore how those
motivations could be reconstructed into explicit arguments for the
intended normative claims. This will help us identify and formulate
issues of utmost importance to the very foundations of belief revision
theory—or so I will argue in Section 6.
Achieving these goals means that I will have to set aside, or just mention
in passing, many other interesting topics in belief revision theory. But
this is exactly why we need multiple survey articles to complement one
another.
One last point of clarification before we get started, regarding the kind of
belief that will concern us in this article. Compare the following examples.
(i) Ann is 95% confident that it will rain tomorrow.
(ii) Ann believes that it will rain tomorrow.
belief revision theory 351
Sentence (i) attributes to Ann a quantitative doxastic attitude toward a
certain proposition, called a credence. There are infinitely many such quan-
titative attitudes that she could have had toward that proposition. She
could have had, say, credence 50%, 50.1%, or 50.17% in that proposition.
By contrast, sentence (ii) attributes to Ann a qualitative doxastic attitude
toward a certain proposition, call a belief. There are two qualitative dox-
astic attitudes she could have had toward that proposition: believing it,
or not believing it.1 The subject matter of this article is concerned with
revision of beliefs (qualitative doxastic attitudes). For revision of credences
(quantitative doxastic attitudes), please see the chapter “Precise Credences”
(Titelbaum, this volume).2
2 belief revision theories as normative theories
I mentioned earlier that a belief revision theory is, roughly, a theory saying
which ways of belief revision are OK and which are not, which I am going
to explain in greater detail in this section.
2.1 What a Belief Revision Theory Is Like
Consider the following constraint on an agent at a time.
Preservation. If the information that agent A receives at time t is
compatible with the set of the beliefs that A has right before t, then,
right after t, agent A retains all of her beliefs in response to that
information.
(By “the” information one receives at t, I mean the conjunction of all pieces
of information that one receives at t.)3 This constraint on belief revision
is formal in the sense that it concerns the logical properties of beliefs
rather than their particular contents. Due to its formal nature, Preservation
usually receives the following reformulation:
Preservation. If φ is compatible with B, then B is a subset of B ∗ φ,
where:
1 If you wish, you can count one more attitude: disbelieving a proposition. It is debatable
whether disbelieving P can be reduced to believing ¬P.
2 This raises an issue: how should the revision of beliefs and the revision of credences be
related? For the first few works that address this issue, see Arló-Costa and Pedersen (2012),
Lin and Kelly (2012), and Leitgeb (2014). Also see the chapter “Full and Partial Belief”
(Genin, this volume).
3 What if one receives no piece of information at t? What is the conjunction of the empty
set of propositions? Answer: it is a tautology. Think of the conjunction of a set S of
propositions to be the weakest proposition that entails every proposition in S—or, in terms
of algebraic logic, define the conjunction of S as the the greatest lower bound of S in the
lattice of propositions under discussion.
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 B is the set of one’s beliefs right before the receipt of new
information,
 φ is the new information one receives,
 B ∗ φ is the set of one’s new beliefs in response to new informa-
tion φ.
Preservation offers just one possible constraint on belief revision, and we
will discuss more constraints below.
Preservation as just formulated is a mere constraint, a condition that one
may turn out to satisfy or violate at a time; there is nothing normative or
evaluative in itself. But when a belief revision theory contains Preservation,
it is typically understood to make the following normative claim:4
Preservation Thesis (the “Perfect Rationality” Version). One
is perfectly rational only if one has never violated, and would never
violate, Preservation.
Once a normative thesis is put on the table, a philosopher’s first reaction
would be to explore potential counterexamples (whether or not she wants
to confirm or refute the thesis). Here is one.
Example (Three Composers).5 The agent initially believes the fol-
lowing about the three composers Verdi, Bizet, and Satie.
4 We may want to clearly distinguish what is normative (such as ‘ought’) from what is
evaluative (such as ‘good’, ‘rational’, and ‘justified’). But this distinction is irrelevant to the
purposes of this article. Understand my use of ‘normative’ to be a shorthand for ‘normative
or evaluative’.
5 This scenario is adapted from an example due to Stalnaker (1994). Stalnaker uses it to
argue against a different constraint on rational belief revision.
Rational Monotonicity. If ψ is compatible with B ∗ φ, then B ∗ φ ⊆ B ∗ (φ ∧ ψ).
Stalnaker considers two alternative possibilities: the agent could receive E or E ∧ E′ as the
information at a certain time. And then Stalnaker asks how the agent should set up a belief
revision strategy as a contingency plan to deal with these two possibilities. Substituting E
and E′ for the φ and ψ in Rationality Monotonicity, Stalnaker obtains his counterexample
to it. That is what Stalnaker does, which appears to be different from what we are doing
here about Preservation, for two reasons. First, Preservation is a proper consequence of
Rational Monotonicity under the weak assumption that B ∗ > = B, where > is a tautology.
Second, Stalnaker’s own example lacks an essential feature of our scenario here: the agent
receives two pieces of information, E and E′, successively. Indeed, it is the second revision,
prompted by the later information E′, that is alleged to violate Preservation. That is, in
terms of the (∗)-notation, it is the revision of the second belief set B ∗ E into the third belief
set (B ∗ E) ∗ E′ that is alleged to violate Preservation. That said, it should not be surprising
that Stalnaker’s case against Rational Monotonicity can be easily modified into a case
against Preservation, thanks to the formal resemblance between these two constraints on
belief revision. In case you are interested, here is a bit more history about the Composers
case: Stalnaker’s own example is a variation on an example due to Ginsberg (1986), which
is in turn a variation on an example due to Quine (1982). Both Ginsberg and Quine use
their examples to talk about counterfactuals rather than belief revision.
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(A) Verdi is Italian;
(B) Bizet is French;
(C) Satie is French.
Then the agent receives this information.
(E) Verdi and Bizet are compatriots.
So the agent drops her beliefs in A and in B, and retains the belief
in C that Satie is French (after all, information E has nothing to do
with Satie). Of course, she comes to believe the new information E
that Verdi and Bizet are compatriots, while suspecting that Verdi and
Bizet might both be Italian, and that they might both be French. So,
at this stage, the agent does not rule out the possibility that Verdi is
French (and, hence, a compatriot of Satie). So what she believes at
this stage is compatible with the following proposition.
(E′) Verdi and Satie are compatriots.
But then she receives a second piece of information, which turns out
to be E′. Considering that she started with initial beliefs A, B, and C
and received information E and E′, which jointly say that the three
composers are compatriots, now she drops her belief in C.
Let us focus on this agent’s second revision of beliefs, prompted by in-
formation E′. Information E′ is compatible with what she believes right
before receiving this information, and she drops her belief in C nonethe-
less. So this agent’s second revision of beliefs violates Preservation. But
there seems nothing in the specification of the scenario that prevents the
agent from being perfectly rational. So this seems to be a counterexample
to the Preservation Thesis.
This cannot be the end of the dialectic, of course. We want to think
about whether one may save the Preservation Thesis by explaining away
the alleged counterexample—an issue that we will revisit in Section 5. This
is just to give a taste of what it is like to work in belief revision theory.
2.2 What Normative Interpretations Could Be Intended?
The Preservation Thesis is only one of the many normative theses that we
can formulate in terms of Preservation. Here is a sample:
(T1) An agent is rational at a time only if she does not violate
Preservation at that time.
(T2) An idealized agent is perfectly rational only if she has never
violated and would never violate Preservation.
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(T3) A strategy for belief revision is rational only if every possible
revision licensed by it does not violate Preservation.
(T4) An agent is rational at a time only if, other things being equal,
she does not violate Preservation at that time.
(T5) Other things being equal, an agent should not violate Preserva-
tion.
A belief revision theory is meant to affirm or deny some theses like these.
This list is by no means exhaustive. There are at least two dimensions
along which we can generate more theses for a belief revision theory to
affirm or deny (or be silent about).
As to dimension one: note that Preservation is only one of the many
possible constraints on belief revision. So, in theses T1–T5, we can easily
replace Preservation by a distinct constraint on belief revision.
As to dimension two: note that theses T1–T5 are formulated in terms
of ‘ought’ or ‘rational’. So, if there are multiple senses of ‘ought’, then
the above ought-thesis will have to be multiplied. Similarly, if epistemic
rationality is not identical to, or is only a special kind of, instrumental
rationality, then the above rationality-theses will have to be duplicated.
One more example: we might be interested in not only whether one’s
revision is rational, but also whether it is justified. So, for example, we can
consider the thesis that an agent is justified in revising her beliefs the way
she does only if her revision does not violate Preservation.
So, given a constraint on belief revision (such as Preservation), we can
formulate various normative theses in terms of that constraint. A belief
revision theory is meant to affirm or deny some such theses.
2.3 Which Normative Interpretation Is to Be Intended?
Most belief revision theories in the literature are usually understood to
make claims only about idealized rationality, e.g. affirming or denying
theses of the form T2. But why?
Here is a potential reason. Many belief revision theories assume that
the agent’s belief set B is closed under deduction, so those theories can
be interpreted as talking about a logically omniscient agent, who believes
every logical consequence of what she believes. So those theories can be in-
terpreted as talking about a kind of perfect rationality that only a logically
omniscient agent can have. But this is not a good reason for restricting the
interpretation to idealized perfect rationality. For, following Levi (1983),
a deductively closed set B of sentences can also be used to express the
commitments of an ordinary, non-idealized agent’s beliefs. Under this
alternative interpretation, revision of B is revision of the commitments of
one’s beliefs.
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As it turns out, the decision to focus on certain kinds of normative
interpretations rather than some others actually involves a difficult choice
among research programs in belief revision theory—or so I shall argue in
the following.
As a preliminary step, let me argue that T1 should not be an intended
normative content of a belief revision theory, because T1 has a quite
obvious counterexample.
Example (One’s Embarrassing Past). Suppose that propositions
A, B, C are logically independent, in the sense that all the 8 (= 23)
combinations of their truth values are logically possible. An agent
started by believing A without commitment to the truth or falsity
of B or C. Then she received information B and, in response, she
somehow dropped her old belief in A and came to believe ¬A ∧ B,
without commitment to the truth or falsity of C. So she violated
Preservation at that time. Since then she has retained those beliefs
and has not received any new information. Remembering all these
in her embarrassing past, now she receives new information C. She
is wondering what to believe.
What is she supposed to do in order to be a rational agent now? Since
the new information C is compatible with what she believed just now, to
satisfy Preservation now the agent has to continue to believe ¬A ∧ B. But,
if Preservation really represents such a good standard to abide by, the
rational thing for her to do now is to retract her belief in ¬A ∧ B and come
to believe A, B, and C instead—as if she had never violated Preservation.
So T1 should be rejected even by those who are sympathetic to Preservation
as a requirement of rationality.
It is not just that T1 is false. When we replace the Preservation constraint
in T1 by any other formal constraint ever studied in the belief revision
literature, the resulting thesis—a formal variant of T1—is also false. The
reason is that the constraints studied in belief revision theory are formal,
having nothing to do with the contents of one’s beliefs and hence making
no reference to one’s beliefs about one’s revision history. So the case of
One’s Embarrassing Past can be suitably adapted to refute every formal
variant of T1. Lesson: every belief revision theory in the literature, when
interpreted to make claims of the form T1, is false.
If we are sympathetic to Preservation as a good standard to abide by,
there are two possible ways out.
Strategy 1 (Get Hands Dirty Today). Fix thesis T1 by weakening
Preservation in such a way that avoids the above counterexample
while retaining the spirit of Preservation.
Strategy 2 (Pay off the Debt in the Future). Deny T1 but affirm
T2, T3, T4, T5, or their variants. Namely, redirect our attention, at
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least for the moment, to idealized rationality, or the rationality of
strategies instead of agents, or ceteris paribus norms. But keep in
mind that this incurs a debt: we will, at some point, need to say how
the truth of theses like T2–T5 can be employed to shed light on the
rationality of a non-idealized agent’s belief revision without a ceteris
paribus clause.
These two possible ways out correspond to very different projects one may
pursue in belief revision theory. Let me illustrate.
Here is what it is like to pursue Strategy 1 (Get Hands Dirty Today).
Consider the following weakening of Preservation.
Preservation∗. If (i) the new information one receives at t is com-
patible with the set of beliefs that one has just before t and (ii) one
does not believe at t that one has violated Preservation before, then,
right after t, one retains all of one’s beliefs in response to the new
information.
This constraint is non-formal (i.e. referring to contents of one’s beliefs), and
it weakens Preservation by adding (ii) to the antecedent. Now formulate
the following non-formal variant of T1.
(T∗1 ) An agent is rational at a time only if she does not violate
Preservation∗ at that time.
This thesis is logically weaker than T1, weak enough to escape the case
of One’s Embarrassing Past. For the agent violates antecedent (ii) and,
hence, satisfies Preservation∗ vacuously. The problem with this weakened
Preservation∗ is that it is too weak for those who want to save the spirit of
Preservation as a constraint on rational belief revision. Do you think that
you violated Preservation at least once in the past? I think I did, although
I cannot tell when exactly. Most people, if asked, would say that they
violated Preservation at least once in the past, too. So most people satisfy
Preservation∗ vacuously by violating antecedent (ii). Lesson: if we think
that the spirit of Preservation is on the right track toward a nontrivial
constraint on rational belief revision, we need to weaken Preservation
by adding an appropriate antecedent that hits the “sweet spot,” making
the reformulated Preservation weak enough to avoid potential counterex-
amples and substantial enough to guide our belief revision. Hitting such
a sweet spot might require careful addition of complicated clauses into
Preservation, making our hands dirty now.
It is possible to keep our hands clean at least for the moment. If Preser-
vation really represents such a good standard to abide by, then it seems
pretty safe to affirm thesis T2. For, in response to One’s Embarrassing Past,
we can simply judge that the agent in question simply fails to be perfectly
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rational due to her embarrassing past, no matter how she is going revise
her beliefs at the present time. So, to keep our hands clean, we can develop
a belief revision theory that only makes claims about idealized, perfect
rationality, such as T2. But this only makes our hands clean for the time
being, for it actually incurs a debt that we will have to pay off later. There
is nothing wrong in developing a theory of perfect rationality for idealized
agents. But we want such a theory to shed light on a theory of rational
belief revision for ordinary agents like us. What’s the light to be shed? To
answer this question is to pay off the debt.
Similarly, if Preservation really represents such a good standard to
abide by, it seem pretty safe to affirm thesis T3. For, in response to One’s
Embarrassing Past, we can say that the revision strategy that the agent
has been following through time is simply irrational. But then one day
we will have to pay off the debt: we will have to explain how a theory of
strategic rationality sheds light on a theory of agential rationality. Similarly,
adoption of T4 or T5 incurs its own debt: we will have to say how ceteris
paribus norms would apply to concrete cases, which would require us to
develop, for example, a logic for defeasible deontic reasoning.6 So what
confronts us is this problem:
Choosing Among Research Programs. Should we get our hands
dirty today, or should we incur a debt today and promise to pay
it off in the future, by directing our attention to perfect rationality,
strategic rationality, or ceteris paribus rationality?
The literature, as developed today, seems more inclined to opt for the route
of perfect rationality.
In the rest of this article, we will follow the literature, talking about
theses of the form T2 most of the time. Just keep in mind that a research
program has been chosen (at least tentatively) and it comes with a debt.
3 formal theories of belief revision
A typical belief revision theory has two parts: the formal part is meant to
formulate certain formal constraints on belief revision, and the normative
part is meant to make some normative claims in terms of those constraints.
It is time to turn to the formal part.
Consider a language L, identified with a set of sentences closed under
at least the standard Boolean operations (i.e., ‘and’, ‘or’, and ‘not’). A finite
sequence (φ1, φ2, . . . , φn) of sentences in L can be understood as a history of
inquiry in which one receives information φ1, then receives information φ2,
. . . , and then receives information φn. A belief revision strategy is meant
6 See Nute (2012) for a number of approaches to defeasible deontic logic.
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to tell one how to change beliefs given any relevant history of inquiry.
Accordingly, we make the following definition.
Definition (Belief Revision Strategy). A belief revision strategy
over language L is a function S : I → ℘(L), where:
 I is a nonempty set of finite sequences of sentences in L that
is closed under subsequences—that is, whenever I contains a
nonempty sequence (. . . , φn), it also contains the truncated
sequence (. . .) that results from deleting the last entry. So the
empty sequence, denoted by ( ), is guaranteed by definition to
be in I . Call I an information space, meant to contain all the
“relevant” histories of inquiry in question.
 ℘(L) is the collection of all subsets of L, i.e. all sets of sentences
in L.
 S(φ1, φ2, . . . , φn) is understood as the set of beliefs that strategy
S would recommend for an agent at the end of inquiry history
(φ1, φ2, . . . , φn). In the limiting case, the value of function S at
the empty sequence ( ), written S( ), denotes the set of beliefs
recommended at the beginning of the inquiry.
I have to confess that the S-notation used here is not quite standard in
the literature. But in this article we will encounter three different kinds of
belief revision theories, and the S-notation is the simplest one for unifying
all the three.
A formal theory of belief revision, no matter how it is presented, works
by imposing a constraint on belief revision strategies, allowing for some
strategies and ruling out the others. Accordingly, we make the following
definition.
Definition (Formal Theory of Belief Revision). A formal theory
of belief revision over language L is (or can be identified with) a set of
belief revision strategies over L.
A formal belief revision theory T can be turned into a normative theory
once it is given a normative interpretation, such as: “an agent is perfectly
rational only if there exists a belief revision strategy in T that she has been
following and would continue to follow.” (Just a reminder: alternative
interpretations have been discussed in Section 2.2.)
3.1 Simple Belief Revision Theories
Let I≤1 be the set of all sequences of sentences in L with lengths ≤ 1. So it
does not consider successive revisions of belief. A belief revision strategy
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is simple iff it is defined on I≤1. A set of such strategies is called a simple
formal theory of belief revision.
Suppose that we only care about simple belief revision for the moment.
Then the S-notation just introduced is an overkill, and it would be more
convenient to work with the notation of B and ∗ introduced earlier. Here
is the translation between these two notations:
S( ) = B, the initial set of beliefs;
S(φ) = B ∗ φ, the set of new beliefs in light of new information φ.
So Preservation can be reformulated as follows.
Preservation. For any φ compatible with S( ), S( ) ⊆ S(φ). In other
words, for any φ compatible with B, B ⊆ B ∗ φ.
The set of simple belief revision strategies that satisfy Preservation is
a formal theory of belief revision. It corresponds to a strictly weaker
constraint than the standard, AGM belief revision theory, as we will see in
Section 4.1.
3.2 Iterated Belief Revision Theories
The information space I≤1 just considered is very small. What about
working with a larger information space? Let Ifinite be the set of all finite
sequences of sentences in L. A belief revision strategy S defined on Ifinite
says a lot. It says how to revise beliefs when one receives information φn+1
that follows inquiry history (φ1, . . . , φn): just change the set of beliefs from
S(φ1, . . . , φn) to S(φ1, . . . , φn, φn+1). It even says how to revise beliefs when
one receives information φ but then, unfortunately, receives information
¬φ: change the set of beliefs from S(. . . , φ) to S(. . . , φ,¬φ). A set of belief
revision strategies defined on Ifinite is called an iterated belief revision
theory.
For example, consider the set of all belief revision strategies S : Ifinite →
℘(L) that satisfy the following.
Iterated Preservation. For any finite sequence (φ1, . . . , φn) of
sentences and any sentence φn+1 in L, if φn+1 is compatible with
S(φ1, . . . , φn), then S(φ1, . . . , φn) ⊆ S(φ1, . . . , φn, φn+1).
This constraint is strictly weaker than many iterated belief revision theories
in the literature, as we will see in Section 4.5.
3.3 Belief Revision Theories for Inductive Inferences
Sometimes we may want to have an information space I that is just right,
not too big and not too small. Consider an empirical problem: “Are all
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ravens black?” Call this the Raven Problem. Let language L contain the
following sentences:
h = the hypothesis “all ravens are black”;
bi = “the i-th observed raven is black”;
ni = “the i-th observed raven is non-black.”
An inquiry history relevant to the Raven Problem describes the color of
every raven observed in that history. For example, (b1, b2, b3, b4) says that
we have observed four ravens and all of them are black; (b1, b2, b3, b4, n5)
says that we have observed five ravens with the first four being black and
the last one being non-black. Let Iraven be the set of all finite sequences
whose i-th entry is either bi or ni. Iraven is meant to exclude any sequence
that contains h, because, let us suppose, scientists never receive h as
information. In the present case, the point of working with Iraven (rather
than the much larger information space Ifinite) is that we want to be clear
about which pieces of information can be available to a scientist for solving
the Raven Problem. Furthermore, reference to Iraven is essential when we
define how well a belief revision strategy performs as a solution to the
Raven Problem, as we will see in Section 4.6.
We might come to believe h when they have observed a certain number
of black ravens without a single non-black one. But how many black ravens
suffice for a rational or justified belief in h? A belief revision strategy
defined on Iraven is meant to give an answer. For example, a strategy Sskep
that follows inductive skepticism would say that no finite amount of black
ravens suffices; that is, h 6∈ Sskep(b1, . . . , bn) for every positive integer n.
4 how to construct formal theories
In this section we will review a number of techniques for constructing
formal theories of belief revision. Those techniques can be taken as mere
formal tools for constructing formal theories of belief revision. But those
formal techniques are usually associated with some motivations or in-
terpretations, which might do some interesting philosophical work. To
anticipate, in Section 6 we will examine how interpreted techniques of
theory construction could be turned into explicit arguments for normative
claims about belief revision.
4.1 Axiomatization
Consider the following axiom system, stated in terms of B and ∗, where
B + φ denotes the set of logical consequences of B ∪ {φ}:
Axiom System AGM.
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(Closure) B ∗ φ is closed under logical consequences.
(Extensionality) If φ and ψ are logically equivalent, then B ∗ φ =
B ∗ ψ.
(Success) B ∗ φ contains φ.
(Consistency) If φ is consistent, then B ∗ φ is consistent.
(Accretion) If φ is compatible with B, then B ∗ φ = B + φ.
(Super-Accretion) If ψ is compatible with B ∗ φ, then B ∗ (φ ∧ ψ) =
(B ∗ φ) + ψ.
Note that Accretion implies Preservation. These constraints on B and ∗ can
be easily translated to constraints on belief revision strategies S—just recall
the translation provided earlier: B = S( ) and B ∗ φ = S(φ). So the AGM
axiom system defines a formal theory of simple belief revision, i.e. the set
of simple belief revision strategies that satisfy those axioms. The ideas of
this belief revision theory can be found in Harper (1975), Harper (1976),
and Levi (1978). But this theory is usually called AGM because Alchourrón,
Gärdenfors, and Makinson (1985) prove a representation theorem for it, to
be presented in the next subsection. The axiomatization provided here is
equivalent to the standard—but more complicated—axiomatization found
in their 1985 paper.
If you think that the AGM axiom system is too strong and would like to
work with a weaker one, the following is an option, where the first four
axioms are borrowed from AGM:
Axiom System P+
(Closure)
(Extensionality)
(Success)
(Consistency)
(Cautious Monotonicity) If ψ ∈ B ∗ φ, then B ∗ φ ⊆ B ∗ (φ ∧ ψ).
(Or) If ψ ∈ B ∗ φ1 and ψ ∈ B ∗ φ2, then ψ ∈ B ∗ (φ1 ∨ φ2).
I call it P+ because this axiom system minus Consistency is, in a sense,
equivalent to the well-known system P of nonmonotonic logic.7 Every
axiom in P+ can be derived from the AGM axiom system, but the converse
7 This assumes the standard translation between belief revision theory and nonmonotonic
logic (Makinson & Gärdenfors, 1991), which I present in the appendix (Section 8.1).
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does not hold. In particular, axiom system P+ does not imply Accretion
because it does not even imply a logically weaker constraint: Preservation
(and we will be in a position to prove this claim in Section 4.4).
4.2 Partial Meet Contraction
Let us turn to a second technique for constructing a simple belief revision
theory. This technique works pretty much by telling a story of a rational
agent who is deciding which beliefs to retain or to abandon.
Suppose that an agent’s new information φ is incompatible with her
belief set B. Then, before she adds φ into her set of beliefs, it seems a
good idea for her to drop some old beliefs, i.e. to remove some sentences
from B in order to obtain a (smaller) set that does not entail ¬φ, so that
the addition of φ would not cause any inconsistency. Denote this set by
B÷ ¬φ, called the contracted set of beliefs free from commitment to ¬φ.
Once the agent obtains the contracted belief set B÷ ¬φ, she can safely
add φ to it and close it under logical consequences, and thereby obtain
(B÷¬φ) + φ as the new belief set. Namely:
Levi Identity. B ∗ φ = (B÷¬φ) + φ.
At its core, this amounts to constructing a revision procedure as the
concatenation of two other procedures: one for removing beliefs (÷) and
the other for adding beliefs (+). The process from B to B ÷ ¬φ is call
contraction, and the problem is how to find the contracted belief set B÷¬φ.
In typical cases there are multiple candidates for B ÷ ¬φ (i.e. multiple
subsets of B that do not entail ¬φ). Which one would/could serve as the
B÷¬φ that the agent needs for the sake of rational belief revision?
That problem has a standard, formal solution, called partial meet con-
traction, which is the focus of this subsection. Let B⊥¬φ denote the set of
all inclusion-maximal subsets of B that do not entail ¬φ. In other words,
B⊥¬φ contains X iff X is a set obtained by removing no more sentences
from B than necessary—retracting no more old beliefs than necessary—in
order to achieve compatibility with new information φ. Then, to proceed
further, a prima facie plausible idea is to (i) select “the best” candidate in
B⊥¬φ and let it be the contracted belief set. What if there is no uniquely
best candidate? Then perhaps the agent may try to (ii) arbitrarily select
one of the best candidates in B⊥¬φ, and let it be the contracted belief
set. But what if the agent feels unable to make such an arbitrary selection
given multiple best candidates? The standard proposal is to (iii) intersect
all of those best candidates and obtain an even smaller set of sentences, to
be identified with the contracted belief set B÷¬φ.
This last idea, (iii), is what underlies so-called partial meet contraction,
and can be formally presented as follows.
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Definition (Selection Function for a Belief Set). A selection
function for B is a function γ such that, for every collection M of
subsets of B:
(a) γ(M) ⊆ M if M 6= ∅,
(b) γ(M) 6= ∅ if M 6= ∅,
(c) γ(∅) = {B}.
The idea is that, for any nonempty collection M of candidates, γ is meant
to return γ(M) as the set of best candidates in M. Then, for each sentence
φ, let γ generate B÷¬φ as follows:
Partial Meet Contraction. B÷¬φ = ⋂ γ(B⊥¬φ).
(In case you are interested: while the above formalizes idea (iii), it turns
out that idea (i) can be modeled by the special case in which γ returns a
singleton.)
In general, given a selection function γ for a belief set B, it defines a
contraction operator ÷ by partial meet contraction, which then defines
a revision operator ∗ by Levi identity. Initial belief set B and revision
operator ∗ then jointly define a simple belief revision strategy. So a set of
selection functions generates a set of simple belief revision strategies, i.e. a
simple belief revision theory.
We want to sort out selection functions that are “OK” in order to use
them to produce belief revision strategies that are “OK.” But which se-
lection functions are “OK”? Imagine that there is a binary relation ≥ on
subsets of B. Understand X ≥ Y as saying that X is at least as “good” as
Y with respect to ≥ (so presumably we want ≥ to be at least transitive
and reflexive). Then we can require γ to select the “best” items as fol-
lows. For any sentence φ (which serves as the new information) such that
B⊥¬φ 6= ∅:
γ(B⊥¬φ) = {X ∈ B⊥¬φ : X ≥ Y for all Y ∈ B⊥¬φ}.
Whereas if B⊥¬φ = ∅, then γ(B⊥¬φ) = {B}. Say that a selection function
γ for B is transitively (and reflexively) relational iff there exists a transitive
(and reflexive) relation ≥ that generates γ in the way just presented.8 It
seems tempting to think that a selection function is “OK” only if it is
transitively and reflexively relational.
It turns out that the transitively relational selection functions generate
all and only the simple belief revision strategies that satisfy the AGM
axioms—a classic result due to Alchourrón et al. (1985). So we have two
8 Note that not every transitive and reflexive relation ≥ generates a selection function for B.
This is because a careless design of ≥ could easily result in a γ that violates condition (b),
which is required by the definition of selection functions.
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equivalent presentations of the same set of revision strategies: one is to use
the AGM axioms to define a set of revision strategies, and the other is to
construct a set of revision strategies from (1) Levi identity, (2) partial meet
contraction, and (3) the set of transitively relational selection functions.
This is a representation result, a result saying that two apparently different
constructions or definitions lead to one and the same thing.
If any “at-least-as-good” relation ≥ employed to define a selection
function should be both transitive and reflexive, then the classic AGM rep-
resentation result seems to miss something: we see transitivity mentioned,
but where is reflexivity? Don’t worry. Rott (1993) proves that we can add
reflexivity while retaining the representation result; that is, the selection
functions that are transitively and reflexively relational generate all and
only the simple belief revision strategies that satisfy the AGM axioms.
4.3 Digression: Why Prove Representation Results?
We have seen a representation result, and will see more. Although repre-
sentation results are very interesting from a mathematical point of view, it
is less clear what their philosophical significance is. So let us step back and
think about how a representation result might be put into philosophical
service.
Here is the first possible philosophical service. Suppose that we are
searching for counterexamples to the belief revision theory based on, say,
partial meet contraction. Then, thanks to the above representation theorem,
we are exactly searching for counterexamples to the belief revision theory
based on the AGM axiomatization—with a bonus: it is usually easier
to work out putative counterexamples by contemplating on axioms. So
a representation result can be instrumental to the search for potential
counterexamples.
But we should not overemphasize the importance of this instrumental
role in philosophy. A representation result is sometimes overkill for this
instrumental role. Without a representation result, it is still possible to find
a potential counterexample to the belief revision theory based on partial
meet contraction. It is not hard to see that any belief revision strategy,
if constructed from partial meet contraction, must satisfy the Preserva-
tion constraint.9 So Preservation provides a sound (albeit incomplete)
axiomatization of partial meet contraction. If we can find a counterex-
ample to Preservation interpreted as a normative thesis, then we already
have a counterexample to the belief revision theory based on partial meet
contraction—all done without applying a representation result.
9 For, when the new information φ is compatible with the initial belief set B, we have that
B⊥¬φ = {B}, and hence the contracted set of beliefs ⋂ γ(B⊥¬φ) must be B itself, to
which the agent is going to add φ in order to form the new belief set B ∗ φ = B + φ.
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The lesson seems to be the following. A partial, sound axiomatization
already starts to facilitate the search for potential counterexamples. It
would be great if we also had a representation result. For then we are sure
that, if there is any genuine counterexample, it must violate at least one of
the axioms mentioned in the representation result—look no further. But
it is difficult to decide how much time to invest in proving a represen-
tation conjecture, especially if the only payoff is an aid to the search for
counterexamples.
A representation result might provide another philosophical service.
Consider the belief revision theory T whose formal part is axiomatized by
the AGM axioms. Assume the following.
(E) We have tried very hard to work out potential counterexamples to T
but in vain.
Then this is good evidence for theory T. Now consider the belief revision
theory T′ whose formal part is constructed from partial meet contraction
with transitively and reflexively relational selection functions. And assume
the following.
(E′) The construction procedure of T′ seems to describe what a rational
agent could follow in order to revise beliefs, and this “somehow”
lends plausibility to T′.
So now we have evidence for T and distinct, independent evidence for
T′. But, given the representation result, T and T′ are one and the same
belief revision theory. So we have two independent pieces of evidence for a
single belief revision theory—this is a case of convergence of evidence. So
a representation theorem can play an argumentative role in the convergence
of evidence for a belief revision theory. But notice that the existence of this
argumentative role is contingent on the truth of E and E′. Also notice that
what E′ means is unclear, depending on what is meant by ‘somehow’—this
is an issue we will discuss more in Section 6.2.
Enough digressions. Let us return to constructions of formal theories of
belief revision.
4.4 Orderings over Possible Worlds
If we think that the construction techniques presented above are too
restrictive due to their commitment to Preservation, we have to look for
more flexible construction techniques, such as the one presented below.
Imagine that we are trying to determine the revised belief set B ∗ φ in
light of new information φ. Assume, for the sake of simplicity, that to
believe something is to rule out some possibilities (except the limiting
case in which one rules out no possibility at all). Which possibilities to
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rule out? We do not treat all possibilities equally; we treat some as more
plausible than some others. We want to rule out the possibilities that are
implausible. This inspires the following procedure.
Step (I). Rule out the possibilities in which new information φ is
false.
Step (II). Among the possibilities that remain on the table, figure
out the worlds that are most plausible, and rule out all the others.
Step (III). Believe that the actual world is one of those that remain
on the table—that is, let B ∗ φ be the set of sentences that are true in
every possibility that remains on the table.
So a “more-plausible-than” relation between possibilities can be used to
generate a simple belief revision strategy in steps (I)–(III). This idea can
be traced at least back to Shoham’s (1987) work on so-called “preferential”
semantics of nonmonotonic logic,10 given Makinson and Gärdenfors’ (1991)
idea that nonmonotonic logic and (simple) belief revision theory are two
sides of the same coin.11
The informal presentation in the above can be made rigorous as follows.
Suppose that we have a set W of possible worlds for interpreting the
language L in use. That is, suppose that every sentence φ in L expresses a
proposition |φ|, which is a subset of W and understood to contain all and
only the worlds at which φ is true. There are metaphysical views about
what possible worlds are, and there are many different mathematical
models that might or might not reflect what they really are (such as
identifying possible worlds with purely set-theoretic entities, or sets of
linguistic entities, etc.). For present purposes, we only need to care about
how we are going to make use of them, rather than what they really
are. Assume that L is a language for propositional logic. Say that W is
a universe of possible worlds with assignment function | · | for language
L iff: (1) |¬φ| = W \ |φ|, (2) |φ ∧ ψ| = |φ| ∩ |ψ|, and (3) W is fine-grained
enough so that sentences in L are assigned the same subset of W iff they
are logically equivalent.12 Here is an example: let > denote a tautology,
so |>| = W. Note that this model of possible worlds is quite flexible:
a universe W in use is allowed to be so fine-grained that there are two
distinct possible worlds w, w′ in W that make exactly the same sentences in
L true. Namely, a W in use is allowed to make distinctions that language
10 Shoham (1987) talks literally about “more-preferred-to” instead of “more-plausible-than.”
But his point is to use an ordering over possible worlds, no matter how it is to be
interpreted.
11 See the appendix (Section 8.1) for a presentation of this idea.
12 This ensures that a set Γ of sentences entails a sentence φ iff
⋂{|ψ| : ψ ∈ Γ} ⊆ |φ|, which
captures the idea that entailment is truth preservation.
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L does not make (but a richer language possibly does). This flexibility will
be crucial later.
Let ≥ be a binary relation on a universe W of possible worlds for
language L. For any worlds w, w′ ∈W, understand w ≥ w′ as saying that
w is at least as plausible as w′ with respect to ≥. World w is (strictly) more
plausible than w′ with respect to > iff w ≥ w′ 6≥ w. Let max(U,≥) denote
the set of most plausible worlds in U with respect to ≥. To be more precise,
max(U,≥) is defined to be the set of worlds w ∈ U such that w < w′
for no w′ ∈ U.13 Then use ≥ to generate a belief revision strategy S≥ as
follows: given new information φ, let the revised belief set S≥(φ) contain
a sentence ψ iff ψ is true at every possible world in max(|φ|,≥).
Definition (Order-Generated Revision Strategy).
S≥(φ) =def {ψ ∈ L : |ψ| ⊇ max(|φ|,≥)},
which is the revised belief set B ∗ φ;
S≥( ) =def S≥(>) = {ψ ∈ L : |ψ| ⊇ max(W,≥)},
which is the initial belief set B.
So, given an arbitrary binary relation ≥ over W, we can use it to generate
a simple belief revision strategy S≥. Hence a set R of binary relations
can be used to generate a formal theory of simple belief revision, i.e.
{S≥ : ≥ ∈ R}.
But which binary relations≥ are “OK” for generating revision strategies?
We may consider requiring, for example, that any relation ≥ in use be a
preorder, i.e. satisfy the following.
Reflexivity. w ≥ w, for all w ∈W.
Transitivity. If w ≥ w′ and w′ ≥ w′′, then w ≥ w′′, for all
w, w′, w′′ ∈W.
And we may consider the stronger requirement that any ≥ in use be a
complete order, i.e. a preorder that also satisfies the following.
Completeness. Either w ≥ w′ or w ≤ w′, for all w, w′ ∈W.
Completeness is a substantial constraint.
Observation (I). Whenever we use complete preorders to generate
belief revision strategies, Preservation is guaranteed to be satisfied.
Observation (II). Violation of Preservation becomes possible when
we no longer require completeness.
13 Note that this is not the condition that w ≥ w′ for all w′ ∈ U.
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The second observation can be proved in a quite instructive way. The proof
strategy is to construct an incomplete preorder of relative plausibility
that captures the Three Composers case (which served as an alleged
counterexample to Preservation in Section 2.1). Let Ix mean that x is
Italian, Fx mean that x is French. Let Verdi, Bizet, and Satie be denoted
by v, b, and s, respectively. Let IvFbFs denote the possible world in which
Verdi is Italian, Bizet is French, and Satie is French. In general, a possible
world assigns the two nationalities (I and F) to the three composers (v, b,
and s). So there are eight possible worlds, shown in Figure 1. The arrows
IvFbFs
FvFbFs
::
Iv IbFs
OO
IvFb Is
dd
Fv IbFs
::OO
FvFb Is
dd ::
Iv Ib Is
dd OO
Fv Ib Is
dd OO ::
Figure 1: Hasse diagram of the Three Composers problem
represent the ordering we are going to define: w ≥ w′ iff either w = w′
or there is a chain of arrows linking w′ upward to w. (This is called a
Hasse diagram.) The rationale behind this ordering ≥ can be seen from the
following, equivalent definition of ≥:
◦ let IvFbFs be the most plausible world, which the agent believes to
be the actual world at the initial stage;
◦ let diff(w) be the set of composers x such that w differs from the
most plausible world IvFbFs in the nationality of composer x.
◦ w ≥ w′ iff diff(w) ⊆ diff(w′); roughly speaking, the less a world
differs from the most plausible world, the more plausible it is.
It is not hard to see that this is an incomplete order. Now we are ready to
show that the above plausibility order is a countermodel that witnesses
Observation (II). At the initial stage, the agent believes that the actual
world is the most plausible world: IvFbFs. Then the agent receives the first
information E, that v and b are compatriots. So the worlds incompatible
with that information are ruled out, as shown on the left side of Figure 2.
At this stage, the agent believes that the actual world is one of the two most
plausible worlds: FvFbFs and Iv IbFs. Then the agent receives the second
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FvFbFs Iv IbFs FvFbFs
FvFb Is
dd
Iv Ib Is
dd
Iv Ib Is
revision in light of E′
19
Figure 2: Revising in light of E, and then E′
information E′, that v and s are compatriots. So the worlds incompatible
with that information are ruled out, as shown on the right side of Figure 2.
At this final stage, the agent believes that the actual world is one of the
two most plausible worlds: FvFbFs and Iv Ib Is. It is routine to verify that the
transition from the left to the right represents the agent’s second revision
of beliefs in the Three Composers case, which violates Preservation. This
establishes Observation (II).
There is one more constraint on orders that we need to consider. The
Consistency axiom, which occurs in both axiom systems AGM and P+,
seems very plausible. But it might be violated when we use a preorder. To
see why, consider a preorder ≥ and a consistent piece of new information
φ such that every world in |φ| is less plausible than some other world in
|φ|. In that case, max(|φ|,≥) = ∅ and hence:
B ∗ φ = S≥(φ)
= the set of sentences in L true at every world in max(|φ|,≥)
= the set of sentences in L true at every world in ∅
= the set of all sentences in L, which is inconsistent.
And this violates axiom Consistency. To satisfy axiom Consistency, the
minimal constraint we need to impose on plausibility orders ≥ is this:
L-Smoothness.14 For every sentence φ in L, if |φ| is nonempty, then
there is no infinite sequence (w0, w1, w2, . . . ) on |φ| such that w0 <
w1 < w2 < . . . .
Now we are in a position to state Grove’s (1988) representation result:
for any simple belief revision strategy S such that S() = S(>), S satisfies
the AGM axiom system iff S is generated by some L-smooth complete
preorder.
14 This is also called the limit assumption in the literature on semantics of conditionals.
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Those who would like to relax the Preservation axiom would be more
interested in the representation result for axiom system P+: for any simple
belief revision strategy S such that S() = S(>), S satisfies axiom system
P+ iff S is generated by some L-smooth preorder over some universe W
of possible worlds. To ensure that the “only if” side holds, it is crucial
to allow W to be sufficiently fine-grained. This result can be obtained by
translating a result in nonmonotonic logic into belief revision theory. To
be more precise, this result is translated from an immediate corollary of
Kraus, Lehmann, and Magidor’s (1990) representation theorem for the
so-called system P of nonmonotonic logic,15 where the translation in use
is due to Makinson and Gärdenfors (1991).16
A technical remark on the use of mathematical tools: Grove (1988) uses
the so-called sphere systems, which do the same job as complete preorders
in the present context. Kraus et al. (1990) use strict partial orders, which
also do the same job as preorders in the present context. It just turns out
that, in order to unify these two works in the same setting, it seems most
convenient to use preorders.
4.5 Generalization to Iterated Belief Revision
The technique we’ve just discussed—constructing plausibility orderings—
can be easily carried over from simple belief revision to iterated belief
revision.
Let ≥ be an order that represents relative plausibility between worlds.
Recall how ≥ determines a belief revision procedure—in three steps. First,
discard the worlds in which φ is false; second, among the worlds that
are still on the table, figure out the worlds that are most plausible with
respect to ≥, and discard all the others; last, let the agent believe that the
actual world is one of those that remain on the table. This is a procedure
for “one-time” belief revision. Next time we receive new information, how
are we to find a plausibility order for our use? It is too bad that the above
procedure discards some worlds and thereby destroys the structure of ≥.
What we need to do, for the sake of iterated belief revisions, is to use the
new information to revise the plausibility order ≥ we currently have and
obtain a new order ≥∗φ—a new plausibility order that we can use when
we receive the next piece of information.
15 Kraus et al. (1990) use a setting slightly different from our current setting: (i) instead of
preorders they use strict partial orders, (ii) instead of primitive possible worlds they use
indexed valuation functions for atomic sentences, and (iii) instead of using > to mean “is
more plausible than,” they use ≺ (but not the other way round!) to mean “is preferred to”
or “is more normal than.” But these differences between the two mathematical settings do
not matter insofar as the underlying idea is concerned.
16 Their translation is presented in the appendix (Section 8.1).
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So let an agent start by having a plausibility order ≥ and believing that
the actual world is among the most plausible worlds, plausible with respect
to ≥. When she receives new information φ1, she uses the new information
to revise the current order ≥ into a new one ≥∗(φ1), and believes that the
actual world is among the most plausible worlds, plausible with respect to
the new order ≥∗(φ1). Then, when she receives another piece of information
φ2, let her repeat the above procedure: use the latest information φ2 to
revise ≥∗(φ1) into a new order ≥∗(φ1,φ2), and believe that the actual world
is among the most plausible worlds, plausible with respect to the latest
order ≥∗(φ1,φ2). In general, after receiving a finite stream of information
φ1, φ2, . . . , φn and revising her plausibility order successively, she will
come to believe that the actual world is among the most plausible worlds,
plausible with respect to the latest order ≥∗(φ1,φ2,...,φn). To recap: the idea is
to construct iterated revisions of plausibility orders:
≥ // ≥∗(φ1) // ≥∗(φ1,φ2) // ≥∗(φ1,φ2,φ3) // · · ·
and let it generate iterated revisions of beliefs (as byproducts or epiphe-
nomena):
≥ //

≥∗(φ1) //

≥∗(φ1,φ2) //

≥∗(φ1,φ2,φ3) //

· · ·
S() S(φ1) S(φ1, φ2) S(φ1, φ2, φ3) · · ·
This idea can be formalized as follows. A strategy for iterated revision
of plausibility orders is a function ≥∗ that maps every finite sequence
(φ1, . . . , φn) of sentences in language L to a preorder ≥∗(φ1,...,φn) over W.
Every order revision strategy ≥∗ generates a belief revision strategy as
follows.
Definition (Order-Generated Revision Strategy).
S≥∗(φ1, . . . , φn) =def {ψ ∈ L : |ψ| ⊇ max(W,≥∗(φ1,...,φn))},
i.e. the set of sentences that are true at every possible world that is
most plausible with respect to ≥∗(φ1,...,φn).
This is how iterations of belief revision can be generated from iterations
of plausibility order revision. While it might be difficult to construct the
former directly, the latter turns out to be not that difficult to construct.
Consider the following construction technique called “cut-and-paste”:
Definition (Cut-and-Paste Revision). Say that ≥′ is obtained from
≥ by cut-and-paste revision on a subset X of W iff:
(1) for all w, u ∈ X, w ≥′ u iff w ≥ u;
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(2) for all w, u 6∈ X, w ≥′ u iff w ≥ u;
(3) for all w ∈ X and u 6∈ X, w > u.
Namely, we “grab” the order ≥ over the whole W, “cut” the part of ≥
over X, and “paste” it on “top” of the other part W \ X, making any world
inside X more plausible than any world outside X (condition 3), without
changing the ordering of the worlds inside X (condition 1), nor changing
the ordering of the worlds outside X (condition 2). Here are two examples
of cut-and-paste revision.
Definition (Conservative and Radical Revisions).
Radical revision of ≥ on φ is cut-and-paste revision of ≥ on |φ|. This
is sometimes called lexicographic revision.
Conservative revision of ≥ on φ is cut-and-paste revision of ≥ on
max(|φ|,≥).
Radical revision changes a lot, while conservative revision just does a little.
What if we want to revise not that much nor that little, but something in
between? Consider the following, very general kind of order revision:
Definition (Canonical Revision). The revision from ≥ to ≥′ in
light of information φ is said to be canonical iff:
(1) φ is true at all worlds that are most plausible with respect to
≥′;
(2) for all w, u ∈ |φ|, w ≥′ u iff w ≥ u;
(3) for all w, u 6∈ |φ|, w ≥′ u iff w ≥ u;
(4) for all w ∈ |φ| and u 6∈ |φ|:
* if w > u, then w >′ u,
* if w ≥ u, then w ≥′ u,
* if w 6≤ u, then w 6≤′ u.
Condition (1) ensures that the new information is to be believed. Condition
(2) ensures that there is no change to the plausibility relation among the
worlds that make φ true. Condition (3) does something similar, ensuring
that there is no change to the plausibility relation among the worlds that
make φ false. Condition (4) appears quite complicated, but it is meant to
capture this intuitive idea: given any worlds w and u that make the new
information true and false, respectively, the plausibility relation of w to u
should not be “downgraded.” Radical revisions and conservative revisions
are both special cases of canonical revisions.
So, to construct a formal theory of iterated belief revision, we can pro-
ceed by specifying a set S of strategies for iterated revision of plausibility
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orders, and then letting it generate a set of iterated belief revision strategies
{S≥∗ : ≥∗∈ S}.
But which ones to put into S? There are at least two dimensions to
consider. First, do we want to allow some strategies in S to output in-
complete orders, or do we want to require every strategy in S to output
only complete preorders? Prefer the former option if you like Preservation;
otherwise prefer the latter option. Second, do we want to require that every
strategy ≥∗ in S always follow canonical revision, i.e. the revision from
≥∗(...) to ≥∗(...,φ) must be a canonical revision on φ? If we do, do we want
to require something more, such as that every strategy in S always follow
radical revision, or that every strategy in S always follow conservative
revision, or some other constraint?
Darwiche and Pearl (1997), for example, opt for complete preorders
together with canonical revision. Some think that the requirement of
canonical revision is too weak: Boutilier (1996) adds the requirement of
conservative revision; Jin and Thielscher (2007) add the requirement that,
for all worlds w, u such that w ∈ |φ| and u 6∈ |φ|, if w ≥∗(...) u, then
w >∗(...,φ) u.
This subsection has presented a reductionist approach that tries to
reduce iterated belief revision to revision of orders, but there has been
the worry that a reductionist approach is too restrictive. See Stalnaker
(2009) for an example meant to support this worry (this example will be
discussed in Section 5.3). Also see Booth and Chandler (2017) for more
examples, meant to argue against any reductionist approach that reduces
iterated belief revisions to functions that send a plausibility order and a
piece of information to a plausibility order.
4.6 Learning-Theoretic Analysis
Perhaps a belief revision strategy is better insofar as it better serves the
goal of one’s inquiry, e.g. the goal of learning whether all ravens are black.
In this subsection, we will construct a belief revision theory by addressing
the issue of how to choose belief revision strategies that serve the goal of
learning well—this is an issue typically addressed in formal learning theory.
We will be guided by two questions. First, how are we to define when a
belief revision strategy performs well with respect to the goal of learning?
No matter how we are to define learning performance, the performance of
a strategy is typically contingent upon what the world is like, something
that we have no control over and lack knowledge about. There might be a
strategy that performs well in one case but poorly in another case, and an
alternative strategy that performs in the opposite way. This brings out the
second question: which strategy is better and which is to be ruled out by
our belief revision theory? The following illustrates a learning-theoretic
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answer with a case study on the Raven Problem Section 3.3: “Are all ravens
black?”
To choose among belief revision strategies for tackling the Raven Prob-
lem, let us draw a payoff table. Table 1, like any typical decision table, has
h ¬h, n1 ¬h, b1, n2 . . . ¬h, b1, . . . , b100, n101 . . .
Sind
Scount
Sskep
Table 1: An incomplete payoff table for the Raven Problem
three kinds of elements: (i) columns, (ii) rows, and (iii) cells. The columns
correspond to the relevant, mutually exclusive possibilities. Recall that
h is the hypothesis that all ravens are black, bi means that the i-th raven
observed is black, and ni means that it is nonblack. So, for example, the
first column “h” corresponds to the possibility in which h is true and,
hence, all ravens are black. The column “¬h, b1, . . . , bi, ni+1” corresponds
to the possibility in which not all ravens are black and the first nonblack
raven to be observed is the (i + 1)-th one. The rows correspond to the
options to choose from. In the above table there are only three options—
three belief revision strategies—which I will define soon. Each row and
each column intersects at a cell, in which we will specify the outcome of
the corresponding option in the corresponding possibility. Each of those
outcomes will concern how well a belief revision strategy serves the goal
of learning the true answer to the question posed: “Are all ravens black?”
When all those outcomes are specified, we will try to figure out which
options that are “OK”, or at least which are not “OK.”
The three strategies listed in the decision table are defined as follows.
The skeptical strategy Sskep always asks one to believe the logical conse-
quences of one’s accumulated information, no more and no less. That
is:
Sskep(φ1, . . . , φi) =def Cn{φ1, . . . , φi},
where CnX denotes the set of logical consequences of X. So, for ex-
ample, Sskep(b1, b2, . . . , bi−1, ni) contains ¬h because ni entails ¬h. But
Sskep(b1, b2, . . . , bi) excludes h no matter how large i is—so this strategy is
what the inductive skeptic would recommend.
An inductive strategy is a strategy that starts from asking one to believe
just the logical consequences of the accumulated information, but after
observing a certain amount of black ravens in a row without any coun-
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terexample, it asks one to believe h, the inductive hypothesis that all ravens
are black. Here is an example:
Sind(φ1, . . . , φi) =def

Cn{φ1, . . . , φi, h} if i ≥ 100 and φj = bj for
all j ≤ i,
Cn{φ1, . . . , φi} otherwise.
This strategy decides to make the inductive leap at the 100th black raven.
We could replace 100 with another positive integer, which would generate
another inductive strategy.
A counter-inductive strategy works as follows: when seeing more and
more black ravens in a row without any nonblack raven, this strategy
will start to ask one to believe ¬h at some point—violating Ockham’s
Razor—and it will ask one to believe h only at a later point. Here is an
example:
Scount(φ1, . . . , φi) =def

Cn{φ1, . . . , φi,¬h} if 50 ≤ i < 100 and
φj = bj for all j ≤ i,
Cn{φ1, . . . , φi, h} if i ≥ 100 and φj = bj
for all j ≤ i,
Cn{φ1, . . . , φi} otherwise.
What makes it counter-inductive is the first clause. Replacement of 50
and 100 with other numbers m and n (with m < n) would generate other
counter-inductive strategies.
For the sake of simplicity, let us compare just the three strategies explic-
itly defined above, although infinitely many more can be considered if we
wish. So we have only three rows in the payoff table to think about.
Next: fill the cells with outcomes. The kind of outcome to be specified
should say how well a strategy performs to help one achieve the goal,
where the present goal is set to learn whether all ravens are black. The
following introduces two performance criteria.
Say that a strategy will learn whether h is true given a column C iff,
whenever C holds and one obtains more and more information, there will
be a “learning moment” at which the strategy asks one to believe, and
always continue to believe, the unique answer in {h,¬h} that is true given
C. The following definition makes this more precise.
Definition (Learning with Respect to the Raven Problem). A
strategy S will learn whether h is true given column C iff:
for any infinite sequence (φ1, φ2, . . .) such that:
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* every finite segment of (φ1, φ2, . . .) is in the information
space Iraven in use (that is, every entry φi is either bi or ni),
* the conjunction
∧
i≥1 φi is compatible with possibility C,
there exists a natural number n, called a “learning moment,”
such that:
* for each i ≥ n, S(φ1, φ2, . . . , φi) is consistent and entails the
unique sentence in {h,¬h} that is true given C.
Here I only define the concept of learning for solving the Raven Problem,
but generalization is straightforward—please see appendix (Section 8.2).
An essential feature of this definition is that it refers to the information
space Iraven in use, which is meant to include all and only the pieces of
information that can be available to the inquirer. In principle we can try to
solve the Raven Problem by adopting a strategy for iterated belief revision,
which is defined on the much larger information space Ifinite that contains
all finite sequences of sentences. But, in that case, we still need to use the
smaller information space Iraven to correctly define (or characterize) when
a strategy will learn the true answer given a column.
We are now in a position to fill some cells with (partial) outcomes: see
Table 2. An occurrence of “Y” in a cell means: “yes, the strategy will learn
h ¬h, n1 ¬h, b1, n2 . . . ¬h, b1, . . . , b100, n101 . . .
Sind
Scount
Sskep N Y Y . . . Y . . .
Table 2: Payoff table for the Raven Problem continued
whether h is true given this column.” Similarly, “N” means: “no, it won’t
learn.” Just to check that we get this part right: given the first column “h”
(“all ravens are black”), when more and more black ravens are observed,
the skeptic strategy will never ask one to believe the true answer h, and
hence, it will not learn whether h is true given column “h.” That said,
the skeptic strategy will learn whether h is true given any other column
“¬h, b1, . . . , ni”: the right answer is obtained, and held on to, beginning
from the i-th observation, because ni entails ¬h. It is not hard to verify
that the cells left blank in the above should all be filled with “Yes.”
We want to think about, not just whether a strategy will learn, but
also how well it learns. It would be great to have a strategy that might
occasionally points to a falsehood but, once it points to the truth, it will
never let it go. If a strategy has that property given a column, say that it
is stable given that column (which is arguably a virtue that Plato praises
belief revision theory 377
towards the end of Meno). For example, the counter-inductive strategy is
not stable given the column “¬h, b1, . . . , b100, n101”: it asks one to believe
the truth ¬h on the 50th observation, but fails to continue to do so on the
100th, violating stability. Now, for each cell, let us specify (i) whether the
strategy will learn and (ii) whether it is stable: see Table 3. The answers to
(i) and (ii) for each cell are specified in the first and second components of
the ordered pair, respectively.
h ¬h, n1 ¬h, b1, n2 . . . ¬h, b1, . . . , b100, n101 . . .
Sind (Y, Y) (Y, Y) (Y, Y) . . . (Y, Y) . . .
Scount (Y, Y) (Y, Y) (Y, Y) . . . (Y, N) . . .
Sskep (N, Y) (Y, Y) (Y, Y) . . . (Y, Y) . . .
Table 3: Payoff table for the Raven Problem completed. The first component
concerns whether it will learn; the second, whether it is stable.
With the payoff table completed, it is time to think about which strategies
are “OK” and which are not. Presumably, learning is better than failing
to learn; stability is better than instability. With that in mind, a learning
theorist would be interested in arguing that both the skeptical strategy
Sskep and the counter-inductive strategy Scount are not “OK”. Three styles
of arguments are available for consideration.
Style 1. We can argue that both the skeptical strategy Sskep and the
counter-inductive strategy Scount are not “OK” if we are happy to apply
the Dominance Principle, which says that an option is not “OK” if it is
dominated in the sense that some alternative option performs at least as
well in all columns and does strictly better in some column.
Style 2. To argue for the same conclusion, we do not have to apply
the dominance principle. An alternative is to apply the so-called Maximin
rule. According to Maximin, we are to, first, figure out the worst possible
outcome of each option, and then judge that an option is not “OK” if17
its worst outcome is worse than the worst outcome of some alternative
option. Namely, Maximin asks one to maximize the minimal payoff. The
worst outcomes are identified in Table 4. So, according to Maximin, both
the skeptical strategy Sskep and the counter-inductive strategy Scount are
not “OK”.
Style 3. Perhaps the minimal argument that suffices to obtain the same
conclusion is to rely on a premise of this form:
Template for Achievabilist Theses. If the empirical problem in
question is easy enough so that it is possible to achieve epistemic
17 Note that the Maximin rule is formulated here in terms of ‘if’ rather than ‘if and only
if’; this is to ensure that the Maximin rule is in general compatible with the Dominance
principle.
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worst outcome
Sind (Y, Y)
Scount (Y, N)
Sskep (N, Y)
Table 4: Worst possible outcomes for the Raven Problem
standard X, then a revision strategy for that empirical problem has
to achieve (at least) X in order to be “OK”.
Now, let X be “learning the truth with stability in all the columns (all
the possibilities under consideration)”. The Raven Problem is indeed that
easy, as witnessed by the first row of the payoff table. So, if we are happy
to accept that premise, we can argue that an “OK” revision strategy for
the Raven Problem must (at least) achieve learning and stability in all the
columns, ruling out the skeptical and the counter-inductive strategies.
The learning-theoretic analysis presented above is just a “baby version”
for the sake of illustration. It is adapted from Genin and Kelly (2018)
and Kelly, Genin, and Lin (2016), which build on Schulte (1999) and
Kelly (2007). More generally, a belief revision theory can be constructed
by considering the learning performances of belief revision strategies in
possible scenarios. This idea admits of many possible implementations.
◦ We may consider enriching the specifications of outcomes.
We have only talked about whether a revision strategy will learn
and whether it is stable. But do we also want to consider other kinds
of learning performance? Think about these: How many retractions
of beliefs will be incurred? How many times will a false answer be
believed? How fast will the true answer be learned?
◦ We need to find a way to evaluate revision strategies in terms of the payoff
table.
We may consider using a decision rule such as Dominance and
Maximin. But how about other decision rules like Minimax Regret,
Maximax, or even Maximization of Expected Utility (if the use of
prior probabilities does not beg the inductive skeptic’s question)?
We may also consider relying on one achievabilist thesis or another,
or even a set of such theses. But what achievabilist theses are cor-
rect? That is, what epistemic standards have to be achieved when
achievable?
All those considerations and their possible variants, in combination, pro-
vide what we may call the learning-theoretic toolkit for constructing
belief revision theory 379
various formal theories of belief revision. But which specific tools should
we use in order to construct a belief revision theory that has a plausible
normative interpretation? This issue will be revisited in Section 6.3.
Also see Kelly (1999) for an application of learning-theoretic analysis
to iterated belief revision, which considers the possibility of receiving
mutually contradictory pieces of information.
The learning-theoretic analysis need not be a rival to the aforementioned
approaches to belief revision theory. Indeed, as we have seen, the learning-
theoretic analysis is able to rule out some notable revision strategies, such
as the skeptical and counter-inductive strategies. This ability seems to
complement the more standard, AGM belief revision theory: the skeptical
strategy is not ruled out by the AGM theory because it can be modeled by
a complete order of relative plausibility that takes every possible world
to be equally plausible; the counter-inductive strategy is not ruled out by
the AGM theory, either, because it can also be modeled by an appropriate
complete order of relative plausibility. Perhaps the right theory of belief
revision should be constrained jointly by the learning-theoretic considera-
tions and the considerations that follow, generalize, or weaken the AGM
theory. See Baltag, Gierasimczuk, and Smets (2016) and Genin and Kelly
(2018) for more on the possibility of such a joint project.
4.7 Other Construction Techniques
There are many other techniques for constructing belief revision theories.
Let me mention some of the most influential ones.
◦ Instead of using plausibility orderings over possible worlds, we may
use orderings over sentences, the so-called epistemic entrenchment
orderings (Gärdenfors & Makinson, 1988). This idea has been applied
to both simple belief revision and iterated belief revision (Nayak,
1994).
◦ On the approach of partial meet contraction, it is standardly assumed
that a belief set B be closed under logical consequence, but we may
relax that assumption, letting B be a mere set of sentences, called
a belief base, on which the agent bases other beliefs (Hansson, 1994,
1999).
◦ If we think that almost all formal theories of simple belief revision
in the literature are too strong, we can resort to the standard trans-
lation between simple belief revision and nonmonotonic inference
(Makinson & Gärdenfors, 1991), which I present in the appendix
(Section 8.1), and then translate a sufficiently weak nonmonotonic
logic into an equally weak theory of belief revision. The literature
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of nonmonotonic logic does provide very weak systems, such as
Reiter’s (1980) default logic.18 When we translate Reiter’s default
logic into belief revision theory, the result is even weaker than system
P+, let alone AGM.19
◦ Spohn (1988) proposes an approach to iterated belief revision theory,
which considers belief revisions in situations of the following kind: an
agent receives new information, but she is not fully certain whether
it is true, and somehow has a clear idea of how uncertain she is
supposed to be, where the uncertainty in question is measured by
ordinal numbers. See the chapter on ranking theory (Huber, this
volume).
For an extensive, detailed survey of construction techniques, see Rodrigues
et al. (2011).
5 how to argue against
To argue against a normative theory of belief revision, the paradigmatic
way is to provide intuitive counterexamples. But an alleged counterexam-
ple usually raises a question: “Is that a genuine counterexample?” Let us
think about this issue by discussing concrete examples.
5.1 Three Composers Revisited
Recall the case of Three Composers, which we considered in Section 2.1.
To facilitate cross reference, let me reproduce it below:
Example (Three Composers). Consider three composers: Verdi,
Bizet, and Satie. The agent initially believes the following.
(A) Verdi is Italian;
(B) Bizet is French;
(C) Satie is French.
Then the agent receives this information.
(E) Verdi and Bizet are compatriots.
So she retains the belief in C that Satie is French (after all, information
E has nothing to do with Satie), but drops her beliefs in A and in B.
Then the agent receives another piece of information.
(E′) Verdi and Satie are compatriots,
18 Reiter’s default logic is only one of the many approaches to nonmonotonic logic; see
Brewka, Niemelä, and Truszczyn´ski (2008) for a review.
19 This observation is due to Makinson (1988).
belief revision theory 381
which is compatible with what she believes right before this new
information arrives. Considering that she started with initial beliefs
A, B, and C and has received two pieces of information E and E′,
which jointly say that the three composers are compatriots, now she
drops her belief in C.
Let us recall that the second revision is an alleged counterexample to
Preservation as a necessary condition of perfect rationality.
Anyone who wants to defend Preservation as a necessary condition
of perfect rationality may try responding in either of the following two
ways. First, the defender may try explaining why the agent in the Three
Composers case is actually irrational.
The second possible response proceeds as follows. E′ seems not the kind
of thing that we can actually receive as new information. We would come
to believe E′ by inferring it from the new information that we can actually
receive, such as “my music teacher just told me that Verdi and Satie are
compatriots,” or “I just saw a chart coloring composers in terms of their
nationalities; it assigns the same color, red, to Verdi and Satie but I do not
know which nationality corresponds to red.” So the scenario misspecifies
the new information that the agent actually receives. A realistic scenario
should be more complicated than the one told above. So the above scenario
also underspecifies how exactly the agent comes to gain the new belief in
E′ and drop the old belief in C. The goal of this response is to show that,
no matter how we retell the original Three Composers scenario in a way
free from misspecification and underspecification, the retold story will not
be a counterexample to Preservation.20
To see how one may explain an alleged counterexample away by point-
ing to underspecification or misspecification, let me provide other exam-
ples in the following two subsections.
5.2 Underspecification
Katsuno and Mendelzon (2003) argue that the AGM theory is not univer-
sally applicable. They propose the following counterexample.
Example (Book and Magazine). Suppose that the agent believes
that there is either a book on the table (B) or a magazine on the table
(M), but not both. Consider two alternative developments of this
scenario:
Case 1: The agent is told that there is a book on the table. She then
concludes B and ¬M.
20 I thank Horacio Arló-Costa for bringing this possible response to my attention.
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Case 2: The agent is told that a book has been put on the table. She
then concludes B but continues to suspend judgment about M.
So the agent starts by believing B∨M and ¬(B∧M). Katsuno and Mendel-
zon agree that the AGM theory can easily explain Case 1 as follows: the
agent receives information B and, hence, by the Accretion axiom in the
AGM theory, she comes to believe ¬M. But Katsuno and Mendelzon think
that Case 2 is a counterexample to the Accretion axiom in the AGM theory
because (i) the new information is compatible with the old beliefs and (ii)
the new information plus the old beliefs entails ¬M, which the agent does
not believe after the revision.
The lesson they want to draw is that we need a theory of belief revision
like AGM to deal with Case 1, but we need a distinct theory, what they
call a theory of belief update, to deal with Case 2.
But the AGM theorist could respond by saying that Katsuno and Mendel-
zon underspecify Case 2. Here is one possible way to specify Case 2 with
sufficient detail.
Case 2’: The agent starts by believing not only that B ∨M and ¬(B ∧
M) are both true at t0, but also that if a book is put on the table at
t1(> t0), then, first, B is true at t1 and, second, M is true at t0 iff M
is true at t1. Then the agent is told, at t1, that a book is indeed put on
the table at t1. In this case she should continue to suspend judgment
about M.
Given this more detailed specification of Case 2, the AGM theorist can use
the Accretion axiom to explain why the agent should suspend judgment
about M at t1. Note that the new information is consistent with the set of
her old beliefs. Furthermore, the new information plus the set of her old
beliefs is silent about the truth value of M at t1 (and this is made clear by
explicit references to times t0 and t1). Therefore, by Accretion one should
suspend judgment about the truth value of M at t1.
So Katsuno and Mendelzon’s alleged counterexample does not really
refute the AGM theory. The lesson is that an alleged counterexample may
fail to work due to underspecification.
I want to make a second point. Belief revision theory is very inter-
disciplinary, studied by philosophers, logicians, and computer scientists.
There are people belonging to all the three groups, but there are also
people belonging to only one or two. So different belief revision theorists
might have very different goals in mind when using counterexamples.
A sympathetic reading of Katsuno and Mendelzon’s paper—a paper in
artificial intelligence—suggests that they are interested in situations where
the object language is so austere that it contains no tense operators or
referential expressions about time. So the conclusion they want to draw
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can be charitably understood as saying that, given that the object language
is so austere (and hence computationally easier to deal with), the AGM
theory when restricted to that language cannot accommodate Case 2. This
conclusion should be very interesting to computer scientists: it would
be interesting to see if Case 2 can be accommodated by an algorithm
that manipulates a very simple language and implements a non-AGM
belief revision theory. It is just that this conclusion, although interesting in
computer science, is not equally interesting in epistemology.
5.3 Misspecification
Stalnaker (2009) argues against the following constraint on iterated belief
revision.
Axiom C2 (Darwiche and Pearl, 1997). S(φ1, . . . , φn, α, β) =
S(φ1, . . . , φn, β), whenever the latest information β is incompatible
with the preceding information α.
This says, roughly, that when one receives information α and then the next
piece of information β contradicts α, one ought to revise beliefs as if one
had only received β without receiving α. Darwiche & Pearl’s Axiom C2 is
among the weakest studied in the belief revision literature. Indeed, it is
satisfied by every revision strategy that always follows canonical revision
(which is the weakest requirement of iterated belief revision discussed in
Section 4.5). But Stalnaker (2009) proposes a counterexample to Axiom C2.
Example (Coin Flipping). A fair coin is flipped in each of the two
rooms, 1 and 2. Alice and Bert (who I initially take to be reliable)
report to me, independently, about the results: Alice tells me that the
coin in room 1 came up heads, while Bert tells me the same about the
coin in room 2. So I believe what they tell me at stage one. But then
Carla and Dora, also two independent witnesses whose reliability,
in my view, trumps that of Alice and Bert, give me information that
conflicts with what I heard from Alice and Bert. Carla tells me that
the coin in room 1 came up tails, and Dora tells me the same about
the coin in room 2. These two reports are given independently, and
simultaneously.21 This is stage two. Finally, stage three: Elmer, whose
reliability trumps everyone else, tells me that that the coin in room
1 in fact landed heads. (So Alice was right after all.) What should I
now believe about the coin in room 2?
21 This simultaneity assumption is crucial for Stalnaker’s purposes. Although this kind of
simultaneity (relative to the agent’s frame of reference) is extremely rare, it is still possible.
So this example is a genuine possibility.
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It seems that the agent, at the final stage, should believe that the coin in
room 2 came up tails, for Elmer says nothing that contradicts what Dora
says. But this result, Stalnaker claims, violates Darwiche & Pearl’s Axiom
C2. To see why, let:
α = the conjunction of what Carla says and what Dora says;
β = what Elmer says.
The latest information β contradicts the information α obtained at the
preceding stage, and it does so only because it contradicts the first conjunct
of α (i.e. what Carla says). But Axiom C2 asks the agent to act as if
information α were not received at all and, hence, as if Dora’s testimony
were not received. By contrast, we seem to have the intuition that the agent
should retain her belief in what Dora says—after all, the latest information
β does not undermine what Dora says. The problem with Axiom C2 seems
to be this: it requires that Dora’s testimony be discredited only because it
arrived at the same time as someone else’s discredited testimony.
Those who want to defend Darwiche & Pearl’s Axiom C2 might respond
that Stalnaker actually misspecifies the information in question. The agent
does not really receive any information whose content is that the coin in
room Y came up Z. The information received should be of this form: “agent
X says that the coin in room Y came up Z.” That is, the real information
should not be the content of what people say, but should report the fact
that those people say such and such things. Then there is no contradiction
between the earlier information and the later information in the Coin
Flipping case, and hence there is no violation of Axiom C2—or so the
response concludes.
So, if the above response is right, Stalnaker’s alleged counterexample
fails to work due to misspecification.
This hypothetical exchange between Stalnaker and the defender of
Axiom C2 raises a deep question. The clash between Stalnaker’s counterex-
ample and the defender’s response can be taken as a debate over what
counts as information, assuming that both parties employ the same concep-
tion of information. But what if Stalnaker and the defender presuppose
distinct conceptions of information? That is, what if they are talking past
each other? This question points to a debate concerning the nature or goal
of belief revision theory. According to the conception of information used
in Stalnaker’s specification of the scenario, the information that the agent
receives takes the form of E2 rather than E1.
(E1) Agent X says that the coin in room Y came up Z.
(E2) The coin in room Y came up Z.
But according to another conception of information—the one used in the
response—the agent only receives information of the form E1, while E2
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comes to be believed as a result of revising the agent’s old beliefs in light of
information E1. Now, if the two parties do presuppose distinct conceptions
of information, the real debate is this:
Choice among Conceptions of Information. Which conception
of information should be the one used in belief revision theory?
Or, without presupposing that there is a unique conception of in-
formation to be used in belief revision theory, how should those
conceptions of information play their respective roles in belief revi-
sion theory?
These are difficult questions to answer. If we are going to have two concep-
tions of information in belief revision theory, then we will have to rewrite
the formal theories presented above, for they simply do not distinguish
different conceptions of information. If we are to stick with the more
permissive conception of information that Stalnaker has in mind, then it
seems that we are developing a belief revision theory that does not address
an important kind of belief revision, i.e. the cases in which E2 is believed
as a result of belief revision in light of information E1. But if, instead, we
are to stick with the more restrictive conception of information, then we
will create a slippery slope. Which of the following is the information that
the agent receives?
(E0) Agent X utters ‘the coin in room Y came up Z’.
(E1) Agent X says that the coin in room Y came up Z.
(E2) The coin in room Y came up Z.
If we want a restrictive conception that excludes E2 as information, why not
go for the most restrictive conception that allows only E0 as information,
and take the other two to be something that the agent might come to
believe by revising old beliefs in light of the sole information E0? And,
if we really adopt such a restrictive conception of information, then it
seems pointless to develop a theory of iterated belief revision that aspires
to take care of so many cases, including the cases in which one receives
information α and later receives information β that contradicts α. These
cases would be made impossible or extremely rare by the most restrictive
conception of information.
So which conception(s) of information should we use in belief revision
theory? That is a tough issue, not usually discussed by belief revision theo-
rists. But Gärdenfors (1988), for example, does elaborate on the conception
of information that he intends to work with.
We arrived at a foundational issue from an alleged counterexample to a
belief revision theory. Discussions about counterexamples are important
because we may use them to refute theories, but also because they some-
times raise deep questions concerning what exactly we want to theorize
about.
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6 how to argue for
Arguments for particular belief revision theories do not usually receive
explicit formulations in the literature. But two argumentative approaches
are discernible in the literature. On the first approach, one argues for a
belief revision theory in terms of how well it survives alleged counterex-
amples. On the second approach, a formal but motivated construction of a
belief revision theory is somehow “transformed” into an argument for the
theory. Let me explain these two approaches in turn.
6.1 Argument from Surviving Alleged Counterexamples
We use intuitive examples to refute general theories. So a possible argu-
ment schema we may use is the following.
(i) We have worked very diligently in search of intuitive counterexam-
ples to this normative theory of belief revision but have not been
able to find a genuine counterexample.
(ii) Therefore, this theory is plausible.
This argument is certainly not valid, but perhaps it is harmless to make it
valid by adding a premise: if (i) then (ii).
That is the first approach we may adopt in order to argue for a belief
revision theory, but hopefully not the only approach. We may have con-
flicting intuitions about concrete examples. When we do, we will debate
over premise (i). So it would be great to explore whether there are more
theoretical, general considerations that can help us resolve or mitigate our
disagreement. That brings us to the second approach.
6.2 Argument from Construction: Partial Meet Contraction
On the second approach, a construction of a formal belief revision theory
is to be interpreted and then turned into an argument for a normative
theory of belief revision. I will illustrate with two construction techniques:
first with partial meet contraction (in this subsection), and then with the
learning-theoretic analysis (in the next subsection).
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Belief revision theorists working on partial meet contraction seem to
have the following line of thought in mind. Recall that this construction
technique generates belief revision strategies S as follows:
S(φ) =(0) B ∗ φ
=(1) (B÷¬φ) + φ
=(2)
⋂
γ(B⊥¬φ) + φ
=(3)
⋂{X ∈ B⊥¬φ : X ≥ Y for all Y ∈ B⊥¬φ} + φ.
These equations jointly describe a formal procedure by which we can use
a binary relation ≥ over sets of sentences to generate a belief revision
strategy S. Under a suitable interpretation, this procedure may tell a story
about a rational agent who is trying to revise beliefs, about the sensible
considerations that she has, and about the rational decisions that she
makes. In fact, this story was already sketched in Section 4.2, in which all
formal apparatuses—ranging from ÷, ⊥, γ, to ≥—were introduced with
motivations. (Of course, there are details to be filled into the story sketched
in that section, and some parts of the story may require fine-tuning to
make the whole story plausible.) Some belief revision theorists such as
Gärdenfors (1984) do take the story—the interpreted formal procedure—
very seriously, and they think that the story somehow lends plausibility to
the belief revision theory they construct.
The question I want to discuss here is how the above line of thought
can possibly be turned into an explicit argument with a clearly specified
normative conclusion. Let us explore some possibilities. Suppose that the
procedure (0)–(3) of partial meet contraction has been given an interpreta-
tion in line with the motivations provided in Section 4.2. Suppose, further,
that the normative thesis to be argued for is the following.
Putative Conclusion. An agent is perfectly rational only if she
has been following, and would continue to follow, a belief revision
strategy S that is constructible through procedure (0)–(3).
Note that this putative conclusion does not make the implausibly strong
claim that an agent is perfectly rational only if she actually follows proce-
dure (0)–(3); there may be distinct procedures leading to the same final
product. Now add the following premise.
Premise (I). Procedure (0)–(3), under such and such an interpretation,
describes a possible process for perfectly rational belief revision.
But the above premise alone does not suffice, for it only describes procedure
(0)–(3) as one possible process for perfectly rational belief revision. This
leaves us with the following open question.
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Open Question. Is there a procedure that describes another possible
process for perfectly rational belief revision, but generates a belief
revision strategy not constructible through procedure (0)–(3)?
If the answer is “yes,” then the putative conclusion is false. So, to make
the argument valid, we need to add at least the following premise (or
something to the same effect).
Premise (II). The answer to the above question is “no.”
But this second premise is far from obvious, so an argument for it is
required. Indeed, since procedure (0)–(3) is committed to Preservation,
the Three Composers case is a potential counterexample to Premise (II).
Perhaps one can try to argue that procedure (0)–(3) describes a very
“paradigmatic” process for perfectly rational belief revision—so paradig-
matic that the answer to the open question is “no,” and that the putative
conclusion must be true. It remains to explore how one may elaborate on
this line of thought.
So, for those who are sympathetic to the philosophical significance of
partial meet contraction (0)–(3), a foundational issue in belief revision
theory is how we may provide more premises besides (I) and produce a
sensible, valid argument for the putative conclusion.
But even if such an argument can be produced, Premise (I) can be
challenged. That is, one may challenge the very possibility of a workable
interpretation of procedure (0)–(3). Recall the main idea of this procedure.
Suppose that one receives information φ, and that φ is incompatible
with the set B of one’s old beliefs. Then some old beliefs have to be
retracted before φ is added to one’s stock of beliefs. That is, before one
adds φ, one needs to find a contracted set B÷¬φ of beliefs, a subset of B
that is compatible with φ. It is hypothesized that one should not retract
beyond necessity (but why?).22 So let the agent consider all elements of
the remainder set B⊥¬φ, i.e. all inclusion-maximal subsets of B that are
compatible with φ. Then let relation ≥ sort out the “best” of those subsets.
The intersection of those best subsets,
⋂{X ∈ B⊥¬φ : X ≥ Y for all Y ∈
B⊥¬φ}, is then identified with the contracted set of beliefs, B÷¬φ. That’s
the main idea. But that raises an issue concerning the right interpretation
of ≥. Let us try the following interpretation:
Interpretation of ≥ (1). X ≥ Y means that X is at least as good as
Y as a candidate for B÷¬φ.
Under this interpretation, the intersection of the “best” candidates for
B÷¬φ (“best” with respect to ≥) may not be a “best” candidate for B÷¬φ
(“best,” again, with respect to ≥). So a non-optimal candidate may be
22 For more on this issue, see Rott (2000).
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selected! So this particular interpretation of X ≥ Y makes the construction
process incoherent: one does not choose from the best candidates, but opts
for the intersection of the best candidates, which may be sub-optimal.
What else could X ≥ Y mean? Let us try Gärdenfors’ (1984) suggestion:
Interpretation of ≥ (2). X ≥ Y means that X is epistemically at
least as “important” as Y.
Following this interpretation, procedure (0)–(3) assumes that the contracted
belief set B ÷ ¬φ must be the intersection of the most “epistemically
important” elements of B⊥¬φ. Gärdenfors’ interpretation of ≥ does not
cause any incoherence, but he leaves us with some unanswered questions.
First, how should we understand the concept that Gärdenfors refers to
as epistemic importance? Second, why should the contracted belief set
be the intersection of the epistemically most important candidates? That
is, why are the concepts of belief contraction and epistemic importance
normatively related that way? Plausible answers to these questions are
required if we want to use Gärdenfors’ interpretation of ≥ to defend
Premise (I) and, ultimately, to argue for the putative conclusion listed
above.
So there are a number of issues to address if we want to take seriously
the construction of partial meet contraction and turn it into an explicit
argument. For more on how we may take partial meet contraction seriously,
see Gärdenfors (1984), Levi (2004), and Arló-Costa and Levi (2006).
6.3 Argument from Construction: Learning-Theoretic Analysis
Let us examine another technique for constructing belief revision theories:
learning-theoretic analysis. Recall that this construction selects belief re-
vision strategies according to some decision rule or achievabilist thesis
(Section 4.6). This suggests the following argument schema, where T is a
formal theory of belief revision, i.e. a set of revision strategies.
Premise (I). J (as a decision rule or achievabilist thesis) judges a
strategy to be not “OK” if that strategy is not in T.
Premise (II). If J judges a strategy to be not “OK”, then that strategy
is not rational (or epistemically justified, or the like).
Putative Conclusion. Therefore, a strategy is rational (or epistemi-
cally justified, or the like) only if it is in T.
A candidate for J is the Dominance principle, as mentioned in Section 4.6.
When outcomes, or learning performances, are specified in greater detail,
it is likely that only very few strategies are dominated. Indeed, a general
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feature of the Dominance principle is that it becomes weaker when out-
comes are specified in greater detail. So, in general, it would be difficult to
use the dominance principle to argue for a strong normative thesis.
In that case, one might consider resorting to another candidate for
J mentioned in Section 4.6: the Maximin decision rule. But there is a
longstanding worry that, in many situations, the Maximin rule is too
pessimistic to be the right rule to apply. Indeed, the dominant view in
decision theory is that a correct decision rule has to involve one’s degrees
of belief over the columns in the decision table, rather than (pessimistically)
focusing on the worst possible outcomes. There is a possible response in
favor of applying Maximin to some contexts. The learning-theoretic anal-
ysis is actually developed to address the so-called problem of induction.
Namely, it is meant to respond to the inductive skeptic’s questions: “How
can we justify induction?” “How can we justify inductive strategies rather
than skeptical strategies?” “How can we justify the use of a particular
inductive strategy rather than an alternative inductive strategy?” To prop-
erly address these tough questions, we cannot rely on anyone’s degrees
of belief over the columns in the decision table, for fear of begging the
skeptic’s question—or so Lange (2002) argues. So, to make a decision
without begging the skeptic’s question, the right decision rule, if there is
one, has to be a qualitative decision rule. And the Maximin rule seems a
good candidate—or so this response suggests and promises to elaborate.
This idea, which favors the use of Maximin in some contexts, may be
traced at least back to the Maximin foundation of statistical inference due
to Wald (1950). Note that those sympathetic to the above line of thought do
not have to stick with Maximin but can switch to, and argue for, another
qualitative decision rule that does not presuppose degrees of belief. Kelly
(2007), for example, proposes a kind of dominance principle that applies
to the worst-case bounds of “complexity classes”—a decision rule inspired
by how computer scientists evaluate the efficiency of problem-solving
algorithms.
There is another kind of candidate for J mentioned in Section 4.6,
achievabilist theses, which take this form: “If the empirical problem in
question is easy enough to allow a revision strategy to achieve epistemic
standard X, then a revision strategy for that empirical problem is “OK”
only if it achieves (at least) X.” Achievabilist theses have seldom been
formulated explicitly in learning theory, and they seem to be central to the
way Putnam (1965) and Gold (1967) created formal learning theory in the
1960’s—or so Kelly (1996) seems to suggest. But which achievabilist theses
are correct and how should they be defended or at least motivated? There
have been very few systematic discussions on this issue in the literature,
but see Kelly et al. (2016) and Genin and Kelly (2018) for examples of
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how certain epistemic standards may be motivated and put to use in
achievabilist theses.
7 concluding remarks
We have discussed a number of foundational issues about belief revision
theory. Let us recap what we have covered. Have a look at the italicized
terms below.
A belief revision theory is meant to make normative or evaluative(i)
claims(ii) about revision of beliefs in light of new information(iii).
With respect to (i), we have noted that alternative normative interpretations
can be given to a formal belief revision theory, and have seen that the choice
among those possible interpretations amounts to the choice among very
different research programs in belief revision theory (Section 2.3). With
respect to (ii), we have examined some methods that we may use to argue
for or against the normative claims that a belief revision theory is intended
to make (Section 5 and Section 6), including various potential difficulties or
issues that we need to address when trying to apply those argumentative
methods. With respect to (iii), we have only briefly discussed the issue of
what counts as information and the problem of choosing among different
conceptions of information (Section 5.3).
For discussions of other philosophical issues, see Levi (1983), Levi (1991),
Levi (2004), Gärdenfors (1988), Rott (2000), Rott (2001), Hansson (1999),
Hansson (2003), Gillies (2004), and Genin and Kelly (2018).
8 appendix
8.1 Nonmonotonic Logic and Belief Revision Theory
A nonmonotonic consequence relation is a binary relation |∼ between sen-
tences. Understand φ |∼ψ as saying of |∼ that it licenses the inference from
φ to ψ—a possibly defeasible, inductive, or plausible inference. Nonmono-
tonic logic, if broadly construed, aims at distinguishing nonmonotonic
consequence relations that are good in one sense or another. There are
many approaches to nonmonotonic logic; they differ in the procedures
that are used to sort out “good” nonmonotonic consequence relations; see
Brewka et al. (2008) for a review.
Makinson and Gärdenfors (1991) propose a translation between simple
belief revision strategies S and nonmonotonic consequence relations |∼ .
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Their translation is based on the following bridge principle (which I state
in terms of the S-notation used here):
ψ ∈ S(φ) iff φ |∼ψ.
To be more precise: given any simple belief revision strategy S, we can
use the bridge principle to define a nonmonotonic consequence relation
|∼S as follows: φ |∼Sψ iff ψ ∈ S(φ). Conversely, given any nonmonotonic
consequence relation |∼ , we can use the bridge principle to define a
simple belief revision strategy S |∼ as follows: S |∼(φ) =def {ψ : φ |∼ψ} and
S |∼() =def S |∼(>), where > is a tautology.
This establishes a one-to-one correspondence between all nonmonotonic
consequence relations and all simple belief revision strategies S such that
S() = S(>).
8.2 General Definition of Learning
Let an information space I be given, which contains some finite sequences
of sentences, meant to represent possible available pieces of information. Let
a question Q be identified with a set of mutually incompatible sentences,
called the potential answers to Q. The potential answers to Q may, or may
not, be jointly exhaustive—let the disjunction of the potential answers
to Q be understood as the presupposition of question Q. Let a decision
table be given, together with a set C of columns as mutually incompatible
possibilities. Those columns/possibilities are assumed to be so specific
that each column C ∈ C either entails exactly one potential answer to
question Q or it entails the negation of Q’s presupposition. With respect
to the above setting (Q, I , C), define the following concepts.
◦ An I-information stream is an infinite sequence (φ1, φ2, . . .) of sen-
tences such that its finite initial segments are all in I .
◦ Say that an I-information stream (φ1, φ2, . . .) is compatible with a
column C ∈ C iff the infinite conjunction ∧i≥1 φi is compatible with
possibility C.
◦ The true answer to question Q given column C, written Ans(Q | C),
is defined as the unique potential answer to Q that C entails, if such
a unique answer exists; otherwise, Ans(Q | C) is undefined.
We are finally in a position to define learning with respect to the above
setting.
◦ Say that a strategy S will learn the true answer to question Q given
column C just in case:
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(1) the true answer Ans(Q | C) exists;
(2) for each I-information stream (φ1, φ2, . . .) compatible with C,
there exists n ≥ 1, called a “learning moment,” such that for
each i ≥ n, S(φ1, φ2, . . . , φi) is consistent and entails Ans(Q | C).
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